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STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION-WILDLIFE

PROTECTION VERSUS

IN-

RIGHTS-United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
DIAN TREATY HUNTING

I.

INTRODUCTION

While hunting for deer on his reservation, Dean Fryberg, an Indian,
shot and killed a bald eagle. ' Although he had a treaty right to hunt on the
Tulalip Reservation 2 under the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliot, 3 Fryberg was
charged by information with taking a bald eagle in violation of the Eagle
Protection Act of 1940.4 He did not possess a permit which would have
5
allowed such a taking under the Act.
The Ninth Circuit in UnitedStates v. Fryberg6 held that the Eagle Protection Act abrogated 7 Indian treaty hunting rights to take and kill bald

1. Haliaeetus leucocephalus Linnaeus. Of the eight sea eagles that comprise the genus Haliaeetus, the bald eagle is the only new world representative. The sea eagles are not closely related to
the more common and widespread golden eagle, Aquila chrysaetos Linnaeus. G. ALLEN, R. KNIGHT
& M. STALMASTER, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BALD AND GOLDEN EAGLES IN WASHINGTON 3
(1980).
2. The Tulalip Reservation is located about 30 miles north of Seattle, Washington, on the shore
of Puget Sound.
3. Treaty of Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927.
4. 16 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), reprintedin part in notes 5 & 16 infra. The bald eagle is protected
by three different acts of Congress. In addition to its status under the Eagle Protection Act, the bald
eagle is listed as a migratory bird under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§
703-711 (1976). 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1980). It is also listed as an endangered species in the "coterminus [sic] States except WA, OR, MN, WI, MI," and as a threatened species in those excepted
states, in the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). 50 C.F.R. § 17.11
(1980).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever, after investigation, the Secretary of the Interior shall determine that it is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle or the golden eagle to permit the taking, possession,
and transportation of specimens thereof for the scientific or exhibition puiposes of public museums, scientific societies, and zoological parks, or for the religious purposes of Indian tribes, or
that it is necessary to permit the taking of such eagles for the protection of wildlife or of agricultural or other interests in any particular locality, may authorize the taking of such eagles pursuant to regulations which he is hereby authorized to prescribe: Provided. . . . That bald eagles
may not be taken for any purpose unless, prior to such taking, a permit to do so is procured from
the Secretary of the Interior.
At present it appears that all holders of "religious purposes" permits are obtaining eagle parts
through a "carcass bank" set up under 50 C.F.R. § 22.13 (1977), rather than from live birds. Letter
from C. R. Bavin, Chief, Div. of Law Enforcement, Dept. of the Interior, to author (Mar. 20, 1981)
(on file with the WashingtonLawReview).
6. 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
7. The term "abrogation" as used in this note includes partial abrogation or "modification" of
treaty rights, "limitation" of treaty rights, and "regulation" of treaty rights.
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eagles. 8 The court, therefore, upheld the lower court's finding of guilt. 9
In deciding that the Eagle Protection Act abrogates certain Indian treaty
hunting rights, the Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion in Fryberg than that reached by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. White. '0
Fryberg also raises troubling implications for future judicial resolution of
conflicts between congressional legislation and Indian treaties because of
its relatively loose test for finding congressional intent to abrogate. This
loose test produced an unobjectionable result regarding eagles,lI but the
test could easily produce less reasonable results in a different factual setting. 12

This note concludes that the loose test used to find abrogation in Fryberg is unsatisfactory where a statute regulating a nonendangered resource is involved and instead proposes an alternative test for determining
whether abrogation has taken place. Basically, the proposed test facilitates a finding of abrogation where endangered resources are involved and
inhibits such a finding where nonendangered resources are involved. The
proposed test would achieve the same result regarding eagles as reached
in Fryberg, without creating the potential for undesirable results for nonendangered resources.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
FederalWildlife ProtectionLaw

A.

States are the primary source of regulations on the taking of wildlife. '3
8. 622 F.2d at 1016. Although the court did not directly address the issue, Fryberg also argued
that the Act lacks the specificity required of a criminal statute. His brief stated that construction in his
favor was given additional impetus by "the general rule favoring strict construction of penal statutes
and lenity in favor of the accused." Brief for Appellant at 20-21. This statement was not given
further support or emphasis in the briefs, which may explain why the Frvberg court did not consider
the statute's criminal specificity to be an issue. The court, however, may have addressed this issue
indirectly. See note 57 infra.
9. The court stated that "[elven though there was no express statement on the 'face of the [Eagle
Protection] Act' or in the legislative history that Congress intended to abrogate or modify Indian
treaty hunting rights, . . . it is clear from the 'surrounding circumstances' and 'legislative history' . . . that Congress intended . . . to prohibit the taking of bald eagles, in the absence of a

permit." 622 F.2d at 1016.
10. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
1I. The Act provides needed protection against extinction for eagles and it also treats Indians as a
preferred class in providing for regulated taking of eagles under a permit system. See note 5 supra.
The limited holding of Fryberg on the Eagle Protection Act is thus one with which the Indian community can be satisfied.
12. For example, such a loose test would be unwarranted where: (I) the resource is of crucial
dietary or other economic importance to the Indian tribes involved; (2) the resource to be regulated is
not in danger of extinction; or (3) the regulatory or prohibitory statute makes no provision for preferential treatment of Indians.
13. Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indiansand Federal Wildlife Law. 31 STAN. L. REv.
375 (1979).
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Indian Treaty Hunting Rights
Certain kinds of plants and animals, however, are given special protection by federal law and federal regulatory systems. None of the five principal federal wildlife statutes 14 expressly refer to Indian treaty rights.
Four of the five statutes, however, contain exemptions for Indians or Native Alaskans. 15 One of those four, the Eagle Protection Act, has played a
significant role in the development of the law of Indian treaty abrogation.
The Eagle Protection Act of 1940 prohibits the molestation or possession of bald eagles without a permit. 16 Both the legislative history 17 and
the preamble' 8 cite the risk of biological extinction as justifying the Act's
proscription. Subsequent amendments to the Act fall into two categories:
(1) those increasing the Act's sanctions and coverage; 19 and (2) those ex-

14. These are: The Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1976); The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976); The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
of 1971, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976); The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1361-1407 (1976); and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
15. See Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 13, at 405. For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act provides the following exemption to its "moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine mammal products":
(b) The provisions of this chapter shall not apply with respect to the taking of any marine
mammal by any Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo who dwells on the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or
the Arctic Ocean if such taking(1) is for subsistence purposes by Alaskan natives who reside in Alaska, or
(2) is done for purposes of creating and selling authentic native articles of handicrafts and
clothing . . . ; and
(3) in each case, is not accomplished in a wasteful manner.
16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976).
16. The Act begins as follows:
Whoever,... without being permitted to do so ... shall knowingly, or with wanton disregard
for the consequences of his act take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or
barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle commonly
known as the American eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg
thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or regulation issued pursuant to
[this statute], shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
16 U.S.C. §668 (1976).
17. The purpose of the Act was set forth in the House report by its incorporation of a letter from
the Acting Secretary of Agriculture. This letter warned that without congressional action the bald
eagle "will become extinct" as a result of being hunted for commercial purposes as well as for "no
other reason than that it is . . . a bird of large proportions." H.R. REP. No. 2104, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1940).
18. The preamble to the 1940 Act declared the importance of the bald eagle as the national symbol and as a symbol of freedom, and also declared that "the bald eagle is now threatened with extinction." Pub. L. No. 76-567, § 1,54 Stat. 250.
19. This category includes the 1962 amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (amending
16 U.S.C. § 668-668a (1940)), extending the Act's protection to golden eagles. Congress made
this extension because young bald eagles were occasionally killed by people mistaking them for
golden eagles. H.R.J. Res. 489, 76 Stat. 1246, reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1453. Also in this category is the 1972 amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-535, § 1, 86 Stat. 1064 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1940)), increasing the penalties for violating the Act.
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20
panding, in limited terms, the purposes for which permits can be issued.
Thus, whenever Congress has reexamined the issue of eagle protection, it
has maintained the thoroughness of the Act's prohibitions.

B.

Indian Treaty Abrogation Law: The Development of the "Face of the
Act" Testfor Abrogation

The American Indians were in an inferior bargaining position at the
time they negotiated their treaties with the United States. 2 1 The resulting
relationship between Indians and the United States government is a cross
between that of two sovereign nations and that of a ward and its guardian. 22 It imposes duties on the United States which the Supreme Court has
termed "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. '23 The
20. This category includes the 1962 amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-884. 76 Stat. 1246 (amending
16 U.S.C. § 668a (1940)). allowing permits to be issued for the taking of eagles "for the religious
purposes of Indian tribes." The permit section is quoted in note 5. supra. The argument that this
accommodation of the religious purposes of Indian tribes implies that Indians are otherwise subject to
the Act has not yet been accepted by a court deciding the abrogation question. Some commentators
claim that the "'off-hand dismissal of the Indian exemption" in White is "an unrealistic and unpersuasive interpretation which makes the amendment meaningless." Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 13.
at 412. The same can be said for the Fr'vberg court's "off-hand dismissal" of the issue.
21. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth'--HowLong a Tite is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601. 609
(1975).
22. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), Chief Justice Marshall stated that
the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state" for purposes of obtaining the original jurisdiction of
the Court. Id. at 22. While the issue of original jurisdiction was a narrow one, Marshall took the
opportunity to address, for the first time, the much larger issue of Indian relations with the United
States. The foundation of the federal/Indian trust relationship was set forth with the following statement:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession
to our government, yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy be denominated foreign
nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They
occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in
point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power: [and] appeal
to it for relief to their wants.
Id. at 17. As a consequence of this special relationship, the analogy between Indian treaties and
international treaties is not a perfect one. For example, a standard rule of international treaty construction is that a later enactment which is inconsistent with a prior treaty acts as an implied abrogation. Homer v. United States, 143 U.S. 570 (1892). In the construction of Indian treaties, however.
courts are much less willing to imply abrogations, and thus virtually always embark on an inquiry
into congressional intent to abrogate. See Wilkinson & Volkman. supra note 21. at 620-23 (detailed
analysis of the analogy of Indian treaties to international treaties).
23. Seminole Nation v. United States. 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). The legal principles stemming
from this trust relationship are akin to those found in any fiduciary relationship. and it appears to
make little or no difference whether the trust relationship originated in a treaty; an executive order.

Indian Treaty Hunting Rights
uniqueness of this relationship has complicated the law of Indian treaty
abrogation.
When a tribe signs a treaty with the United States, the tribe's members
become "treaty Indians"; the rights retained by the tribe under the treaty
become "treaty rights." 24 A treaty right can be expressly guaranteed to
the Indians in their tribe's treaty 25 or it can be implied from the omission
of the right from the list of rights surrendered by the tribe. 26 In the latter
case the Indians have retained any right not waived or abrogated in the
treaty; a presumption against waiver operates. 27 In either case, the classification as a treaty right necessarily leads to a judicial determination of the
extent and duration of such rights.
The duration of treaty rights was frequently expressed in terms of perpetuity. 28 Changing circumstances, however, unforeseeably "demanded" modifying treaty terms. 29 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,30 the Supreme Court held that Congress may unilaterally abrogate or modify a

see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963); a secretarial withdrawal, see id.; an agreement
sanctioned by both Houses of Congress (as contrasted with treaties, which are ratified by the Senate
only), see Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); or a statute. For a detailed analysis of this trust
relationship, see Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 21, at 612-17.
24. The term "treaty Indian" is used here to distinguish from what Coggins & Modrcin, supra
note 13, at 387, refer to as "assimilated, or 'emancipated,' non-reservation Indians, and those without treaty rights."
25. In Fryberg, for example, the Treaty of Point Elliot secured to the Indians the "privilege of
hunting.., on opened and unclaimed land." 622 F.2d at 1011 n.2.
26. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,406 (1968) ("Nothing was said
in the 1854 treaty about hunting and fishing rights. Yet we agree ...that the language 'to be held as
Indian lands are held' includes the right to fish and to hunt").
27. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
28. Typical treaty language is, for example, "As long as water flows, or grass grows upon the
earth," see Wilkinson & Volkman, supranote 21. Commentators Wilkinson and Volkman trace that
particular language to Senator Sam Houston in 1854. Id. at 602.
29. In New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916), the Court stated:
It has frequently been said that treaties with the Indians should be construed in the sense in
which the Indians understood them. But it is idle to suppose that there was any actual anticipation at the time the treaty was made of the conditions now existing, to which the legislation in
question was addressed. Adopted when game was plentiful,-when the cultivation contemplated by the whites was not expected to interfere with its abundance,-it can hardly be supposed that the thought of the Indians was concerned with the necessary exercise of inherent
power under modem conditions for the preservation of wild life.
Id. at 563. In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979), however, the Court did construe the treaty fishing rights involved "in the sense in
which they would naturally be understood by the Indians," id. at 676, despite the modem scarcity of
anadromous fish "that had always been thought inexhaustible." Id. at 669. As a result, the Court
upheld a district court injunction requiring the State to protect a 45% to 50% share of runs of anadromous fish for the Indians.

30.

187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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treaty, particularly if done "with perfect good faith toward the Indi31
ans.'In determining whether Congress has exercised its abrogation powers,

courts have applied a variety of "ambiguous tests that facilitate contradictory results." 32 The two predominant tests-between which lies a continuum of intermediate tests 33-are (1) the "face of the act" test, 34 and (2)
the "surrounding circumstances" test. 35 Under the "face of the act" test,
congressional intent to abrogate is acknowledged only if that intent is
clearly expressed on the "face" of the relevant statute. Under the "surrounding circumstances" test, abrogation can be found even in the absence of any expression of abrogational intent in the statutory language or
the legislative history-provided the circumstances surrounding the statute's passage indicate congressional intent to abrogate.
The various abrogation doctrines have evolved from lower courts' dif-

fering interpretations of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the subject. In Menominee Tribe v. United States,36 the Supreme Court held
there was no treaty abrogation when Congress terminated federal supervi-

sion over the property and members of the tribe. 37 The Court therefore
denied the Indians' compensation claim for hunting and fishing rights
they allegedly had lost because of the claimed abrogation. The Court examined the statutory language and legislative history of the Menominee
31. Id. at 566. See note 76 infra (failure of the judiciary to apply that standard to congressional
acts of abrogation). Exercise of the power to abrogate should be restrained for the additional reason
that past dishonoring of the trust relationship has made the good faith of the United States appear less
than perfect. For a concise history of violations of the trust, see Wilkinson & Volkman. supra note
21, at 608-12.
32. Wilkinson & Volkman. supra note 21, at 645.
33. The Court's opinion in Menominee Tribe v. United States. 391 U.S. 404 (1968), for example, has been interpreted as using the intermediate test that congressional intent to abrogate will not
be "lightly implied. " Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 21, at 625.
34. This test, as used in United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974), has also been called
the "rule of express legislative action." Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 21. at 630.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1004
(1980). The "surrounding circumstances" language used in FrYberg as the basis of its abrogation test
seems to have originated in the Supreme Court's statement in Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481. 505
(1973), that " [a] congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or
be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history." Since the Court in Maltt found
that no termination had taken place, the "face of the act" language would seem to have controlled the
result, relegating the "surrounding circumstances" language to the status of a dictum. Thus commentators Wilkinson and Volkman used this statement from Maltz as an example of their "express
legislative action" test, virtually ignoring the phrase "surrounding circumstances." Wilkinson &
Volkman, supra note 21, at 629. It was not until Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip. 430 U.S. 584
(1977), that the Supreme Court used the Mattz formulation to find an abrogatory termination by
emphasizing the "'surrounding circumstances" over the "face of the act." See notes 48-52 & 77 and
accompanying text infra.
36. 391 U.S. 404(1968).
37. Id. at 411.
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Termination Act3 8 and also the circumstances surrounding the passage of
that act, 39 but found that none of these exhibited any congressional intent
to abrogate. The Court stated that, because " 'the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress,' "40 no abro41
gation, and thus no compensable taking of rights, had taken place.
In United States v. White, 42 a case factually similar to Fryberg,43 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Menominee to require that
Congress, in order to affect the treaty hunting rights in question, must
"expressly abrogate or modify the spirit of the relationship between the
38. Ch. 303, § 8, 68 Stat. 250 (1954) (repealed 1973).
39. The surrounding circumstances examined by the Court included the purpose of the Act,
which was "to provide for orderly termination of Federal supervision over the property and members
of the tribe," 391 U.S. at 408, and the fact that the same Congress that had passed the Termination
Act also had passed Public Law 280, which specifically protected treaty hunting and fishing rights of
tribes other than the Menominee. Id. at 410-11.
40. Id. at 413 (quoting Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Broom Co. v. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S.
138, 160 (1934)). The majority in United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974), referred to
this language as "the Menominee doctrine." Id. at 456. See note 42 and accompanying text infra.
41. The Court also stated that Congress would not abrogate treaty rights in "a backhanded
way," 391 U.S. at 412, that is, via a termination act "purporting . . .to settle the Government's
financial obligations toward the Indians." Id. at 413.
In Menominee, there were a number of strong arguments in favor of a finding of abrogation. These
arguments included: (1) that in opposing the Termination Act during congressional hearings, the
tribe's counsel had taken the position that the tribe would lose its hunting and fishing rights; (2) that
the Act expressly stated that state law was to govern the tribe and its members; and (3) that the Act's
companion legislation, the Klamath Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 88-587, 68 Stat. 718 (1954),
expressly protected treaty fishing rights, while the Menominee Termination Act did not. Wilkinson &
Volkman, supranote 21, at 637. Since the Court found no abrogation despite these arguments, Menominee has been referred to as "a particularly strong statement in support of Indian treaty rights."
Id. This conclusion, however, is debatable.
One aspect of the Menominee decision, not mentioned in White or Fryberg, qualifies the argument
that Menominee is a "particularly strong statement." In Menominee, the Court of Claims denied the
tribe's claim of compensation for the rights the tribe had allegedly lost because the lower court found
that the rights had not been lost at all. The petitioner Indians were therefore in a position to benefit by
either affirmance or denial of that decision. Affirmance would secure its rights and reduce state jurisdiction over the tribe while reversal would entitle it to compensation from the United States. On oral
argument before the Supreme Court, both petitioner and respondent urged affirmance of the decision
below (the State of Wisconsin, appearing as amicus curiae, argued for reversal). 391 U.S. at 404. It
is thus arguable that in Menominee the statute in question was construed not so much in favor of the
Indians as in favor of the United States Treasury. Menominee may still be "a cornerstone of Indian
rights," Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 13, at 410, but the inherently nonadversarial nature of such
"friendly litigation" should be noted in gauging the firmness of that cornerstone.
42. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
43. Jackie White was a member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians and a resident of the
Red Lake Reservation. He was observed shooting at a bald eagle on the reservation and was charged
with the unlawful taking of a bald eagle in violation of the Eagle Protection Act. The trial court relied
on the dubious holding of United States v. Cutler, 37 F. Supp. 724 (D. Idaho 1941), in granting
White's motion to dismiss. This dismissal was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 508
F.2d at 454. Unlike the factual setting of Fryberg, however, the treaty that created the Red Lake
Reservation did not expressly reserve the tribe's right to hunt and fish on the reservation. See note 25
supra.
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United States and [these] Indians on their native reservation.' 44 The
court held that there was no express congressional intent to abrogate
treaty rights with the passage of the Eagle Protection Act; therefore, the
Act did not affect the defendant Indian's treaty right to hunt eagles without a permit. The White court applied the Menominee Court's "face of
the act" test, but departed from the Supreme Court's analysis in that case
45
by refusing to consider surrounding circumstances as well.
In dissent, Judge Lay claimed that the Supreme Court's admonition in
Menominee that congressional intent to abrogate is not to be lightly imputed "does not mean that intention may be ignored when it is apparent
from both the subject matter and wording of the statute," 4647 and that
"[tihe absence of express words of abrogation is not decisive."
During the interim between White and Fryberg, the Supreme Court in
1977 decided Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip. 48 In Rosebud, the tribe
sought a declaratory judgment that the original boundaries of its reservation, as defined by treaty, had not been diminished by three subsequent
acts of Congress. These three acts had opened much of the land for sale to
settlers, 49 although they did not expressly state whether they altered the
reservation boundaries.
44. 508 F.2d at457-58.
45.
-'[T]he requirement of 'express' abrogation adopted in White can be located in other cases
only inferentially and only where title to land was at issue." Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 13, at
412. Even commentators Wilkinson and Volkman "concede that White is the first considered application of such a rule." Id. (construing Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 21, at 630). The White
court's failure to apply the "surrounding circumstances" language of Mattz v. Aruett. 412 U.S. 481
(1973), was presumably based on the majority's interpretation of that language as a dictum.
The White court also failed to recognize certain political realities regarding treaty abrogation:
While one might expect such an important consideration [asthe applicability of a regulatory
statute to treaty Indians] to be discussed [on the "face of the act"], it also should be bome in
mind that Indian rights and privileges are very sensitive political subjects; Congress might have
desired that the application of the regulations be decreed by the courts.
Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 13, at 405 n. 191. This is not meant as an endorsement of congressional silence, "eloquent as it may be," Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 620 (1977)
(Marshall, J.,dissenting), but rather as recognizing the likelihood that political realities will continue
to play a role in determining the language of potentially abrogational statutes. This likelihood is
demonstrated by the failure of Congress to refer to Indian treaty rights in the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), despite a memorandum from the Department of the Interior "suggesting that if Congress chose to 'prohibit American Indians from exercising treaty-secured
rights.' it should do so 'expressly.' " Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 13, at 404.
46. 508 F.2d at 459 (citing Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898)).
47. Id. (citing Two Hundred and Seven Half-Pound Papers of Smoking Tobacco v. United
States, 78 U.S. (I I Wall.) 616 (1878)).
48. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
49. At stake was the jurisdiction of the tribe in the "opened" areas, as well as the rights of
thousands of Indians living in the "opened" areas to continue receiving various welfare services
provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. at 616. Justice Marshall, dissenting. noted that "[iln
addition, the ramifications of today's decision may extend to a large number of other reservations
throughout the Nation." Id. at 616-17.
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: "In all cases, 'the
face of the Act,' the 'surrounding circumstances,' and the 'legislative history,' are to be examined with an eye toward determining what congressional intent was.' '50 The Court analyzed the legislative history and the
surrounding circumstances 5 1 and concluded that Congress intended to di52
minish the reservation boundaries.
The treaty in question provided that any subsequent sale of any part of the reservation would not be
valid without the written consent of three-fourths of the adult male Indians on the reservation. In
1901, a federal negotiator obtained the required consent to a cession agreement, but Congress did not
ratify the agreement. The subsequent acts of Congress that did provide for the sale of land and payment to the tribe did not have the required written consent. Two of the acts did, however, have the
written consent of a simple majority, while the "practically unanimous" concurrence of the Indians
in the third act was reported to Congress. Id. at 587 n.2. Furthermore, the subsequent acts materially
changed the payment provisions of the 1901 agreement. The 1901 agreement provided for a fixedsum payment to the Tribe for the "opened" lands, id. at 587, while the subsequent acts provided for
"'money to be paid to the Indians only as it is received . . . from the settlers.' " Id. at 592 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 3839, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1903)). The Court conceded that "the later Acts
of Congress made less secure provisions for payment to the tribe" than did the 1901 agreement. Id. at
588.
50. Id. at 587 (quoting Mattz v. Arett, 412 U.S. 481,505 (1973)).
51. Among the surrounding circumstances the Court examined was the purpose of the 1901
agreement and the three subsequent acts, as revealed by their historical context. The Court stated that
this purpose was to open parts of the reservation to settlement by non-Indians. Id. at 590. The Court
acknowledged that this purpose does not demonstrate congressional intent to diminish the size of the
reservation. Id. at 586-87; see note 52 infra. The Court avoided the implications of this legislative
purpose, however, by contradicting itself. In distinguishing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), in
which abrogation had not been found, the Court stated that "[i]n [the 1901] Agreement, therefore,
we have . . . an unmistakeable baseline purpose of disestablishment." 430 U.S. at 592 (emphasis
added).
52. The Court emphasized the evidence of the tribe's consent in the face of the Court-asserted
irrelevance of that consent. It was apparently trying to establish the good faith of Congress without
explicitly recognizing congressional good faith as an issue in the case. See note 76 infra. The thrust of
the Court's treatment of the consent issue was that "Congress was aware of ... Lone Wolf... which
held that Congress possessed the authority to abrogate unilaterally the provisions of an Indian
treaty." 430 U.S. at 588.
There are some holes in the Court's analysis of the legislative history on congressional intent to
diminish the size of the reservation. The Court stated at the outset that "[t]he mere fact that a reservation has been opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status," id. at 586-87, but this proposition is thereafter ignored. The Court arrived at the conclusion that "the 1901 Agreement, had it been ratified by Congress, would have disestablished" the
"opened" areas of the reservation, id. at 591, and from there supported its finding of an abrogatory
effect in the 1904 Act because the 1904 Act "incorporated verbatim the language of immediate cession of the 1901 Agreement." Id. at 597. The flaw in this analysis is that the Court's finding of an
abrogatory effect in the 1901 Agreement was based on the description of that agreement by the federal negotiator in his discussions with the Indians. He had told the Indians that the 1901 agreement
would" 'leave your reservation about the size and area of Pine Ridge Reservation.' "Id. at 591-92
(quoting Proceedings of a Council with the Indians of Rosebud Reservation, Sept. 5, 1901, in S.
Doc. No. 31, 57th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1901)). The Court overlooked the possibility that the negotiator, in referring to the "size and area of Pine Ridge," may have only been trying to describe the area
that would not be opened to settlement, and thus may have been using the term "reservation"
loosely. In any event, it is arguable that the basis for the Court's finding that the abrogatory effect of
the 1901 agreement was "undisputed fact," id. at 591, is not to be found in the legislative history at
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The Ninth Circuit in Fryberg, relying on Rosebud, held that the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Eagle Protection Act indicated
congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty hunting rights. 53 The Fri,berg court decided not to follow the Eighth Circuit's abrogation test in
White, which focused on the lack of congressional intent to abrogate in
the Act's language, and therefore reached the opposite result on whether
the Act abrogated Indian treaty hunting rights.
III. THE FRYBERG COURT'S REASONING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES" ABROGATION TEST
The defendant, Dean Fryberg, alleged at trial that he shot the eagle to
obtain its parts for use in tribal religious and cultural ceremonies. He
moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution
violated his first amendment religious rights; and (2) the Act does not
apply to Native American Indian treaty hunting rights. 54 The district court
found that Fryberg's purposes in killing the eagle were not religious 55 and
held that the Act does apply to Indian treaty hunting rights. The district
court therefore denied the motion to dismiss and found Fryberg guilty.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's guilty verdict.The court
concluded that congressional intent to abrogate was clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history of the Eagle Protection
Act notwithstanding the absence of an expression of congressional intent
to abrogate on the "face of the act.'" 56
The Fryberg court recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in
Menominee required courts to be careful in imputing congressional intent
to abrogate in the absence of express language, but it nonetheless agreed
all. The Court stated that -[t]he parties agree that . . . [the 1901 agreement] would have resulted in
the diminution of the Rosebud Reservation boundaries." Id. at 587. This stipulation by the petitioner
may have effectively controlled the result of the Court's analysis.
53. 622 F.2d at 1016.
54. Id. at 1011.

55.

Moreover, the district court claimed that even if a religious motive did exist, prosecution

under the Act did not abridge his religious rights. Fryberg did not contest this finding on appeal. Id. at
1011 n.4.
56. Id. at 1016. It is at least arguable that Congress's 1962 amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-884.76
Stat. 1246 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1976)), which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to

issue permits to kill bald and golden eagles for the "'religious purposes of Indian tribes." constitutes
an express statement of congressional intent to otherwise abrogate Indian treaty hunting rights. The
Fryberg court did not use this ground for a finding of abrogation, stating: "'Although a reasonable
implication of this amendment is that Indians are otherwise subject to the Act, we agree with White

that this language in itself does not show an unambiguous express intent to abrogate Indian treaty
hunting rights." 622 F.2d at 1013. The court did use the amendment as evidence of surrounding
circumstances indicating congressional intent to abrogate. See text accompanying note 62 infra.
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with Judge Lay's dissent in White that to examine only the Act's express
language overlooks the Act's primary purpose: to protect eagles. The
court claimed that the Eagle Protection Act is a statute of general applicability which applies to Indians unless a treaty right exists that is inconsistent with the Act. 57 The court distinguished Menominee, which was said
to have involved "the total extinguishment of hunting and fishing
rights,''58 and Washington v. Washingtonf State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Association,59 said to have involved "a substantial infringement on fishing and hunting rights.' '60 The court said that the Eagle
Protection Act, in contrast, constituted "a relatively insignificant modification of the Indian's hunting rights."61 The court continued: "While the
[religious purposes] amendment did not expressly refer to treaty rights, it
is clear that Congress intended the Act to apply to Indians. There was less
reason to state expressly that treaty rights were modified than in those
cases where substantial infringements were involved.' '62 The court dis57. The context of the Frybergcourt's reference to the Act's "general applicability" is not readily apparent. It is possible that the court was responding to the "criminal specificity" argument raised
by the defendant in his brief. See Brief for Appellant at 20-21, discussed in note 8 supra. The court's
treatment of the issue consisted of the following statement:
As we recognized in [United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486,488 (9th Cir. 1976)], the Eagle
Protection Act "is a federal statute of general applicability making actions criminal wherever
and by whomever committed." We quoted from United States v. Bums, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th
Cir. 1973): "Such laws are applicable to the Indian unless there exists some treaty right which
exempts the Indian from the operation of the particular statutes in question."
622 F.2d at 1013. The White majority had raised the "criminal specificity" argument in a rather
summary fashion:
It must be remembered that 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) is a penal statute, that Jackie White was charged
with its violation and by his trial was exposed to possible fine and loss of liberty. The specificity
which we require of our criminal statutes is wholly lacking here as applied to an Indian on an
Indian reservation.
508 F.2d at 459. Judge Lay, dissenting in White, may have been responding to this argument when he
italicized the word "whoever" in the Act, explaining:
"... There is nothing in the legislation to indicate, or from which it can be inferred that the
jurisdiction of the United States was restricted in respect to crimes which are generally applicable throughout the United States to all persons. We are cited to no Act, and find none, indicating
an intention to except this appellant or his tribe from the scope of the Act creating and defining
the offense. Appellant is charged with an offense against the laws of the United States which is
generally applicable to all persons wherever committed .... "
508 F.2d at 461 n.4 (quoting Head v. Hunter, 141 F.2d 449,451 (10th Cir. 1944)).
58. 622F.2dat 1014.
59. 443 U.S. 658 (1979), discussed in note 29 supra.
60. 622 F.2d at 1014.
61. Id.
62. Id. The statement that "it is clear that Congress intended the Act to apply to Indians" is
supported either by the court's discussion of the "religious purposes" amendment immediately preceding it in the opinion or it is supported by nothing at all. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile this
statement with the Frybergcourt's other assertion, see note 56 supra, that it did not consider the 1962
amendment to be a sufficient indicator of congressional intent.
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cussed a series of cases involving state regulation of Indian fishing

rights63 to support its proposition that reasonable conservation statutes
abrogate Indian treaty hunting rights when: (1) the sovereign has jurisdic-

tion over the activity regulated; (2) the statute applies in a nondiscriminatory manner to both treaty and non-treaty persons; and (3) application of
the statute to treaty rights is necessary to achieve its conservation purpose. 64 The court asserted that "[t]he Eagle Protection Act satisfies these
criteria.' '65 Its discussion of the state fishing rights cases emphasized two
points: (1) a conservation statute will presumably achieve its purpose only
if it applies to everyone; 66 and (2) the inherent power of the state is ade67
quate to prevent a species from being driven to extinction.
The court concluded by noting the other "surrounding circumstances"
that, the court claimed, made it "clear" that Congress "intended to ban
63. Washington Dept. of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup I), 414 U.S. 44 (1973): Puyallup
Tribe v. Washington Dept. of Game (Puyallup 1), 391 U.S. 392 (1968): New York ex rel. Kennedy
v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916).
64. 622 F.2d at 1014- 15. This does not mean that states can abrogate Indian treaty rights. The
state conservation cases relied upon in Fryberg, see note 63 supra, all involved Indian rights to fish
on lands outside their reservation boundaries. The state's lack of jurisdiction within reservation
boundaries was established by the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560
(1832): "'[W]ithin their [reservation] boundary, [Indians] possessed rights with which no state could
interfere, and . . . the whole power of regulating the intercourse with them was vested in the
United States." The power of states to regulate the exercise of Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish
outside reservation boundaries was described by the Court in Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dept. of
Game (Puyallup 1).391 U.S. 392. 398 (1968), as follows:
The right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed' places may, of course, not be qualified by the
State, even though all Indians bom in the United States are now citizens of the United
States. . . . But the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians.
65. 622 F.2d at 1015.
66. Id. at 1014 n.8 (citing New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker. 241 U.S. 556. 563 (1916):
United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453. 461 (8th Cir. 1974) (Lay, J., dissenting)).
67. Id. at 1015 (citing Washington Dept. of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II). 414 U.S. 44.
49 (1973) (dictum)). It is unclear whether the federal government has a "police power" parallel to
that of the states, although the federal wildlife protection statutes, see generally note 14 supra. seem
to presume such a power:
[Blecause state agencies and state legislatures were interested primarily in the harvest of game
and fish, to the relative exclusion of "nongame" species, federal intervention and preemption
ensued. All federal wildlife statutes are premised on the need to protect against the decline of
species' populations and on the inability of states effectively to deal with problems of national
scope.
G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 600 (1981). The constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1976), was upheld in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), but the Court's analysis there
was limited to congressional power over wildlife living on public lands, and thus left doubt as to
federal power regarding wildlife outside of federal lands.
Regarding the constitutionality of the Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1976). one
commentary has stated: "Notorious violations of the statute have occurred, and it has been alleged
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all threats to the eagle's survival. "68 The court also noted: (1) that the
language in the legislative history and preambles to the Act and its
amendments warned of the danger of biological extinction; 69 (2) the congressional attempt to eliminate "even incidental dangers" by amending
the Act to extend protection to the golden eagle; 70 (3) the "continued congressional tightening" of the Act's sanctions by the 1972 increase in the
possible fines and prison sentences; 71 and (4) that the exemptions to the
Act are "specifically limited" while the proscriptive provisions are broad
and " 'consistently framed to encompass a full catalog of prohibited
acts.' "72
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS
The Merits and Defects of the Fryberg Court's "Surrounding Circumstances" Abrogation Test

The Fryberg decision diminished the possibility of indiscriminate killing of eagles by treaty Indians. By using the "surrounding circumstances" test, Frybergavoided this inadequacy of White. The "surrounding circumstances" test has other merits as well. For example, it takes
into account the political realities that cause legislators to avoid mention
of treaty rights in later enactments. 73 Where congressional silence is intentional, the strict "face of the act" test is an inadequate gauge of actual
congressional intent.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to visualize situations where the
defects of the "surrounding circumstances" test would outweigh its merits. Congress has enacted, and will continue to enact, many laws potentially affecting treaty rights in nonendangered resources. 74 Many of these
that prosecutions were hedged because of a governmental fear that the statute was unconstitutional.
The few courts and parties which have been involved in litigation under the Act have not shared that
trepidation." Coggins & Hensley, ConstitutionalLimits on FederalPower to Protect and Manage
Wildlife: Is the EndangeredSpeciesAct Endangered?, 61 IowA L. REV. 1099, 1112-13 (1976) (footnote omitted).
68. 622 F.2d at 1015.
69. Id. See generally notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
70. 622F.2dat 1016.
71. Id. See generally note 19 and accompanying text supra.
72. 622 F.2d at 1016 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 441 U.S. 51 (1979)).
73. See note 45 supra.
74. For example, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976),
authorizes and directs the Secretary of Agriculture to "develop and administer the renewable surface
resources of the national forests." Id. § 529. This authority extends over "outdoor recreation, range,
timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes" of national forest administration. Id. § 528. Since
many Indian reservations are adjacent to national forests and thus share the available pool of resources, Forest Service activity necessarily affects Indian treaty rights even where those rights are not
exercisable beyond reservation boundaries.
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resources are valuable to Indians on a commercial level as well as on a
cultural level. An abrogation under these circumstances would not indicate "perfect good faith" 75 toward the affected tribes. Congress, however, can "legally" ignore its threshold good-faith requirement, 76 and
thus the principal protection of Indian treaty rights is left to the courts and
their tests for determining whether abrogation was intended. The Frl'berg
opinion provides inadequate protection to Indian rights because its abrogation test fails to effectively distinguish between endangered and nonendangered resources. Fryberg could thus serve as precedent for finding implied abrogation of treaty rights in a nonendangered resource.
B.

An Alternative Abrogation Test: Construction in Favorof Indians

This note proposes a flexible abrogation test which addresses the
shortcomings of the Ftyberg opinion. The goal of this test is to construe
the relevant statute in favor of the Indians to see if it conflicts with the
treaty. The test calls for a two-part determination. The first level of inquiry is directed at the statutory language: the test applies only if the statute at issue fails to expressly abrogate treaty rights and if the surrounding
circumstances indicate Congress implicitly abrogated treaty rights. If the
surrounding circumstances of the statute do implicitly abrogate treaty
rights, then the second level of inquiry is directed at the foreseeable consequences of a possible abrogation. This second determination invokes
the test's flexibility, for the test allows for a different standard of analysis
depending on whether the statute's abrogational effect on the treaty is
77
favorable or unfavorable to the affected Indians.
75. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
76. Id. Since Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). established the power of Congress
to unilaterally abrogate treaty rights, the Supreme Court has treated the "good faith" of Congress as
an unreviewable political question. For a criticism of the perpetuation of this trend by the Court in
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), see Note. Indian Law Claims-A Question of
Congress's Right to Unilaterally Abrogate Indian Treaty Provisions: Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Richard Kneip. 21 How. L.J. 625 (1978).
77. The proposed test has its roots in cases discussing treaty construction, not statutory construction. Commentators have asserted that "'along but logical jump" is required to extend this "liberal
construction" test of treaty construction to the construction of statutes. Wilkinson & Volkman. supra
note 21,at 626-27. Although the two-part determination made via the mechanics of the proposed test
has not been previously suggested by either a court or a commentator, applying the "liberal construction" test to statutes as well as treaties is not as novel an approach as Wilkinson and Volkman suggest. For example, in McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). the relevant treaty
did not explicitly state whether the Navajos were to be exempt from state taxes. The Court effectively
applied the "liberal construction" rule to "ambiguous" language in the subsequent act admitting
Arizona to the Union, Pub. L. No. 61-219, 36 Stat. 557 (1910), and refused to give this language a
"crabbed or restrictive meaning." Id. at 176. The Court thus held that the Navajo treaty precludes
applying the Arizona state income tax to Indians on the Navajo reservation. Id. at 175.
Furthermore, implicit in Wilkinson and Volkman's discussion is the assumption that "liberal con-
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The proposal assumes that in some situations, however rare, abrogation of a treaty right can be favorable to the affected Indians. 78 In such a
situation, the proposed test would operate to give the "surrounding circumstances" criterion greater weight in construing the statute. At the
same time, the weight given the "face of the act" criterion would be
diminished. By weighing the relevant criteria in this manner, the test
would facilitate a finding of abrogation where abrogation is favorable to
Indians. On the other hand, where abrogation is not favorable to Indians,
the proposed test would inhibit a finding of abrogation. This inhibition
would be achieved by reversing the weight of the relevant criteria: the
lack of a "face of the act" intent to abrogate would be given greater
weight than the "surrounding circumstances." The proposed test thus approximates a choice between the two existing tests, with the desirability
of abrogation serving as the determining factor.
An advantage of the proposed test is that it combines the beneficial
aspects of the "face of the act" test with those of the "surrounding circumstances" test. Like the "surrounding circumstances" test employed
by the Ninth Circuit in Fryberg, it balances the interest in treaty sanctity
with the interest in endangered resource protection. Like the "face of the
act" test employed by the Eighth Circuit in White, it assures that treaty
rights in other resources will be fully protected against inadvertent findings of abrogation where none actually took place. The proposed test also
serves to eliminate the principal drawbacks of both the "face of the act"
and the "surrounding circumstances" tests. Unlike the "face of the act"
test, it does not create, in the context of endangered resources, the potential for the ultimate loss of the resource through immoderate taking by
Indians under a treaty right. And unlike the "surrounding circumstances"
test, it does not create, in the context of nonendangered resources, the
potential for loss of treaty rights to the resource through immoderate application of the test by reviewing courts.

struction" can only result in preventing a finding of abrogation. The "liberal construction" test is
given new significance, however, by the proposition that abrogation can sometimes be favorable to
the affected Indians, even though it is possible that this proposition is only valid in cases of endangered resources. Acceptance of the proposition enables a court to lean toward abrogation under one
set of facts, and toward nonabrogation under another, without being inconsistent.
78. The author believes that the paternalistic aspects of determining such "favorability" are as
unavoidable as they are regrettable. Commentators have previously advocated, in the context of equal
protection analysis, that courts scrutinize legislation to determine if it "indeed furthers Congress's
fiduciary obligation to Indians." Johnson & Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L.
REv. 587, 606 (1979). While courts will deny their own power to engage in such scrutiny, the author
believes that they engage in it more often than they admit.
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Application of the ProposedTest to Fryberg

The factual setting of Fryberg may be the best example of an abrogation favorable to Indians. Many Indian tribes are willing to police themselves to apprehend and censure those taking excessive numbers of eagles. 79 The surveillance of an endangered eagle population, however,
requires sophisticated equipment and personnel that the federal government is far more able to afford than are individual Indian tribes. It is foreseeable, then, that a nonabrogatory interpretation of the Eagle Protection
Act would lower the risk of detection for Indian eagle-killers. This situation would enable a few misguided Indians to kill many eagles. Since the
bald eagle population is already classified as "endangered" in many
states, the loss of eagles through hunting by Indians would greatly increase the danger of biological extinction of the species. Subsequent generations of Indians would thus be deprived of a living cultural component.
Furthermore, the Act's provisions for limited taking by permit strongly
favor Indians over non-Indians. 8 0 A strong argument can therefore be
made that construing the Act as partially abrogating Indian treaty hunting
rights achieves a result favorable to Indians. In this context, the proposed
test would give greater weight to the "surrounding circumstances" indicating abrogation than to the "face of the act" indications of nonabrogation.
If, on the other hand, Fryberg had been charged with killing a mallard
duck 8 l without a permit, the proposed test would achieve the opposite
result. Mallards are protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. 82 Like
79. For example, a draft conservation ordinance of the Quinault Indian Nation of Washington
State provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to hunt, fish, trap, kill, capture, or possess any fish (including shellfish), wild bird or animal on the Quinault Indian Reservation or elsewhere by exercise
of rights accorded or permitted by reason of (1) membership in the Quinault Indian Nation; (2)
agreement with the Quinault Indian Nation; (3) permit signed by the Quinault Indian Nation

except in accordance with this statute.
MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW G-21 (Am. Ind. L. Tr. Prog. ed.) (1976). The ordinance also provides for
enforcement of its terms "through regular enforcement officers of the Quinault Tribal Police."- Id. at

G-22.
See notes 5 & 20 supra.
81. Anas platyrhychos Linnaeus. The male of this familiar species is distinguished by its uncrested glossy green head and narrow white neck-ring. R. PETERSON, A FIELD GUIDE TO WESTERN
BIRDS 39 (2d ed. 1961). The female is mottled brown with a whitish tail. Id. In United States v.
Cutler. 37 F. Supp. 724 (D. Idaho 1941), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§
703-711 (1976), was held not to apply to an Indian charged with shooting a duck of unreported
species on his reservation. The Cutler court had reasoned that Congress cannot unilaterally abrogate a
treaty, a proposition clearly inconsistent with Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Despite
80.

this defect in the Cutler court's reasoning, the White majority cited Cutler without identifying its
weakness. 508 F.2d at 454.
82. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976); 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1980).
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the Eagle Protection Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and its legislative
history do not refer to Indian treaty rights. Since mallards are not in danger of extinction, 83 applying the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Indians
would not benefit future generations of Indians in the same way that applying the Eagle Protection Act does. Furthermore, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act's permit system does not favor Indians over non-Indians, except in Alaska. 84 It is therefore difficult to argue that applying this Act's
protection of mallards to Indians favors them. It is this situation in which
the "face of the act" test properly seeks to avoid a finding of abrogation.
In such a situation the proposed test, unlike the "face of the act" test,
does not completely ignore an act's "surrounding circumstances." The
proposed test does, however, give greater weight here to the "face of the
act" indications of nonabrogation than to the "surrounding circumstances" indicating abrogation. Under the proposed flexible abrogation
85
test, then, abrogation would not be found.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's recent Fryberg decision turned on the narrow question of the standard to be used in determining congressional intent to
abrogate Indian treaty rights. The language of the wildlife protection statute involved, the Eagle Protection Act, is ambiguous as to whether it
abrogates, modifies, regulates, or in any way applies to existing treaty
hunting rights of Native American Indians. Where endangered species are
involved, the best interests of Indians are served by allowing their hunting
rights to be limited or regulated until such time as the species is no longer
endangered. This is especially true if the hunting rights limitation nevertheless gives Indians greater access to the species than non-Indians are
given. Thus the rationale of the Eighth Circuit's White decision, which
resulted in leaving Indians with the theoretical right to hunt the bald eagle
into extinction, is unsatisfactory.
On the other hand, allowing a limitation on hunting rights has the
drawback of setting a precedent that may result in a less desirable limitation of other treaty rights. The principal flaw of the Fryberg decision,
which reached a different result than that reached in White, is its use of a
83. Mallards are not listed as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1980).
84. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act provide: "In Alaska,
Eskimos and Indians may take, possess, and transport, in any manner and at any time, auks, auklets,
guillemots, murres, and puffins and their eggs for food and their skins for clothing, but the birds and
eggs so taken shall not be sold or offered for sale." 50 C.F.R. § 20.132(a) (1980).
85. Thus the result, if not the reasoning, of the court in United States v. Cutler, 37 F. Supp. 724
(D. Idaho 1941), discussed in note 81 supra, can be harmonized with the result in Fryberg.
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"surrounding circumstances" test for determining whether Congress intended to modify Indian treaty rights by the Eagle Protection Act. The
Fryberg holding precedentially encourages the use of that test in other
cases in which a finding of such congressional intent would produce results unfavorable to Indians.
A more appropriate test of congressional intent, by which courts could
avoid the flaws of both the strict "face of the act" test and the "surrounding circumstances" test, is a proposed flexible test by which the ambiguous statute is construed in favor of the Indians. The proposed test would
assist a finding of abrogation only in those limited circumstances in which
abrogation is in the best interests of present and future generations of Indians. In other circumstances, the test would achieve the traditional constructional preferences, based on the fiduciary duties of the United States
toward the Indians, against abrogation of treaty rights.

Karl Forsgaard

